Orthodox Thinker, Jay Dyer, recently made a statement about division and how we relate the concept of complex divisibility and unity when examining the Doctrine of the Trinity. You can watch the clip here. One of the most persistent objections to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, particularly from Muslim theologians and apologists, is the claim that it violates monotheism. The reasoning goes: if the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, then Christians must believe in three gods, not one. This objection, however, is built upon a philosophical assumption: that we must count everything—including divine persons—by identity. But that assumption is not only philosophically naive; it’s historically and theologically flawed. In this article, we’ll explore the distinction between counting by identity and counting by division, and how recovering this classical framework can resolve the so-called “logical problem of the Trinity.”

Two Modes of Counting — Division vs. Identity

Throughout both ancient and modern times, humans have sought to quantify and categorize the world around them. But what often goes unnoticed is that there is more than one way to count. In classical philosophy, particularly in the ancient and medieval periods, scholars recognized two distinct methods:

1. Counting by Division

This is the classical method. You start with a whole and recognize distinctions within it. For example, take a single sheet of paper. If you label one side “A” and the other side “B,” it’s still one sheet. But if you cut the paper, you now have two parts—not two entirely new things, but divisions within the same original substance. You’re not denying its unity—you’re simply observing its internal distinctions.

This is how many in the ancient world approached counting physical or concrete objects—things like dogs, tools, or people. These are sometimes referred to in medieval philosophy as first-order impositions.

2. Counting by Identity

In this modern method (popularized after Leibniz), you count by absolute numerical sameness. If something is identical in every respect, it counts as one. But if you introduce any distinction—even a relational or functional one—it becomes a separate countable entity.

This approach works well for abstract objects, such as the laws of logic. You can’t have “half” of the law of non-contradiction. These are indivisible, and in medieval philosophy, they are called second-order impositions.

Where Does God Fit?

God, however, does not fit neatly into either of these categories. He is not a concrete material object like a piece of paper, nor is He an abstract law like the principle of non-contradiction. This makes counting God a unique philosophical problem.

So what do we do?

The answer is that we may have to consider God in both ways. When we say that God is one in nature, we’re using a kind of division-counting, recognizing unity in essence despite relational distinctions. However, when we discuss divine attributes (e.g., necessary existence), we may employ identity reasoning, particularly in abstract metaphysical discussions.

This flexibility is not a cop-out. It reflects the fact that God is sui generis—utterly unique, not reducible to created categories. And this is exactly how the Church Fathers understood God when they articulated the doctrine of the Trinity.

The Trinity and the Misuse of Identity Counting

The logical problem of the Trinity (LPT), often presented by Muslim apologists like Jake Brancatella (“The Muslim Metaphysician”), depends on the assumption that all counting must be done by identity. But as we’ve seen, that’s not how classical theology—or classical philosophy—worked.

Jake, for example, argues that the divine essence is identical with each divine person, and thus any real distinction between persons implies a contradiction. But this is a classic case of denying the antecedent and equivocating on what “God” means. As shown in debates with thinkers like Dr. Bo Branson and others, this objection collapses once we recognize that the word “God” is a generic term, much like the Hebrew “El” or Greek “Theos.”

The Bible Uses “God” in Many Ways:

  • Referring to the Father (John 17:3)
  • Referring to the Son (John 1:1; Heb. 1:8)
  • Referring to the Holy Spirit (Acts 5:3–4)
  • Referring to the divine nature in general
  • Sometimes referring even to angels or earthly rulers (Psalm 82:6; John 10:34)

Thus, “God” is not a name with one fixed referent. It can identify nature, person, or function depending on the context. Therefore, saying “The Father is God” is not necessarily saying “The Father is numerically identical with God” in the abstract sense. It may simply be predicating divinity of the Father—a perfectly orthodox move.

The Church’s Answer — One Undivided Essence

The early Church settled this debate—not by collapsing the three Persons into one (modalism), nor by dividing God into three beings (tritheism), but by affirming what the Nicene Creed calls “one essence, undivided,” shared fully by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

This is counting by division: the divine nature is undivided, but the relations within that nature—begetting, proceeding, unbegottenness—allow for three distinct persons.

The Creed doesn’t violate logic; it bypasses a modern reductionist view of counting. The error of the critics lies in trying to fit God into a modern, analytic box. But God—by definition—is beyond boxes.

Conclusion: Philosophical Tools for Apologetics

Recovering the distinction between counting by identity and counting by division is not an academic exercise. It’s a powerful apologetic tool. It allows Christians to respond to objections about the Trinity with clarity, historical backing, and philosophical precision.

So the next time someone says, “Three persons must mean three gods,” you can respond:

“Not if you’re counting the right way.”

Further Reading & Sources:

  • Jay Dyer, Metaphysics of the Trinity (lecture series)
  • David Liebesman, “We do not Count by Identity.”
  • Bo Branson, “The Logical Problem of the Trinity and Its Philosophical Roots”
  • William Lane Craig & J.P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview
  • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Trinity
  • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Medieval Theories of Signification